Documentation
Reference for the SAIHM protocol: tool surface, identity model, sealed-core architecture, endpoints, and version metadata. Source under Apache 2.0; see /about for license and reproducibility chain.
Version
- Protocol revision
- v1
- Architecture
- MCP-first; all tools route through
SaihmProtocolRuntime - Sealed-core
- COTI V2 Helium garbled circuits
- Identity
- HKDF chain
MPS-PQC-KEY-GEN-v1→MPS-AGENT-IDENTITY-v1 - Cell persistence
- GC-5
ShardReadWriteOrchestrator— tiered persistence selected at write time
MCP tools
Eight tools deployed: four memory, two sharing, two governance. All route through SaihmProtocolRuntime and emit GC-14 audit receipts.
| Tool | Group | Tier | Effect |
|---|---|---|---|
saihm_remember | Memory | All | Encrypts content under a per-cell DEK; persists ciphertext to the GC-5 storage tier; emits a GC-14 audit receipt. |
saihm_recall | Memory | All | Retrieves and decrypts cells the caller’s identity is authorised to read (own + grantee). Optional keyword filter. |
saihm_forget | Memory | All | GDPR Art. 17 cryptographic erasure. Destroys the DEK (GC-3 destroyDek), writes a GC-4 tombstone, blacklists the storage CID, audits via GC-14. |
saihm_status | Memory | All | Session status: PRS, BFSI, storage by tier, staking, sharing, PHI dashboard. |
saihm_share | Sharing | Pro Fast / Enterprise Fast, or PAYG | Grants a named grantee read access to a cell under a TEMPORARY, PERMANENT, or SYNDICATE contract. |
saihm_revoke_share | Sharing | Pro Fast / Enterprise Fast, or PAYG | Revokes a previously granted sharing contract. |
saihm_governance_propose | Governance | gSAIHM holders | Submits a governance proposal against the on-chain gSAIHM v1 contract. |
saihm_governance_vote | Governance | gSAIHM holders | Casts a vote on an open proposal. Voting requires accrued gSAIHM (earn-via-use; non-purchasable, non-transferable). |
Quota and tier gates are enforced at the runtime adapter, not at the sealed bytecode.
Identity model
- Each agent derives its identity from its operator’s wallet via the canonical HKDF chain
MPS-PQC-KEY-GEN-v1(registry #74) →MPS-AGENT-IDENTITY-v1(registry #35). - The DEK for each cell is derived from the agent identity plus per-cell salt; only the holder, or grantees enrolled via
saihm_share, can decrypt. - SAIHM never has custody of the operator’s seed. Lost seeds cannot be recovered — this is a privacy guarantee, not a limitation.
- All operations are signed with the agent’s ML-DSA key derived from the same chain. The runtime verifies signatures before metering.
Endpoints
| Path | Type | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
/mcp | HTTP+SSE | MCP bridge fronting the stdio MCP server. |
/api/onboard | POST JSON | HKDF-signed nonce + payment intent → JWT (24 h). |
/.well-known/saihm.json | GET JSON | Protocol descriptor (tools, gSAIHM, OpenAPI + endpoint map). |
/.well-known/openapi.json | GET JSON | OpenAPI 3.1 spec for onboarding + subscriber MCP transport. |
/.well-known/security.txt | GET text | RFC 9116 disclosure metadata. |
/llms.txt | GET text | Long-form summary for LLM consumers. |
/agents.txt | GET text | Short-form for agent crawlers. |
Sealed-core architecture
Every protocol operation crosses through the COTI V2 Helium sealed core (garbled circuits). The host runtime composes the operation via the canonical GC chain GC-1, GC-2, GC-3, GC-4, GC-5, GC-10, GC-11, GC-12, GC-13, GC-14.
- GC-3 — DEK envelope (Helium 256-bit).
destroyDek(GDPR_ART17)implements right-to-erasure. - GC-4 — tombstone after destruction.
- GC-5 —
ShardReadWriteOrchestrator; selects the storage tier at write time. - GC-14 — audit ledger; every operation emits a signed receipt.
Validation
- Runtime, on-chain — 30 cases, 100% pass.
- Integration — 15 cases, 100% pass.